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Abstract: The article analyzes the different implications of an “hard Brexit” on Scotland and Northern 
Ireland, keeping in consideration the obligations deriving from constitutional and international law for 
the two entities of the United Kingdom. In particular, the feasibility and the main implications of the 
processes enabling a future reacquisition of the EU membership, as well as several frameworks for a 
differentiated – and “softer” – Brexit, are separately assessed in order to identify the most prominent 
effects of the combination of domestic and international provisions in each of the two regions.  
 
Structure: 1. Introduction; 2. The future of Scotland between self-determination and European 
Economic Area accession; 2.1. Brief overview on self-determination theories; 2.2. Scottish independence: 
feasibility and consequences; 2.3. Acceding to the European Economic Area: a valid compromise?; 3. 
Irish unification or differentiated integration: mitigating the effects of an “hard Brexit” in Northern 
Ireland; 3.1. The legal framework for a united Ireland; 3.2. Differentiated integration; 4. Conclusions  
 
1. Introduction 
On 23 June 2016, 51,9 per cent of the voters taking part in the “European Union membership referendum” 
expressed themselves in favor of leaving the European Union (EU). The immediate implications of the 
ballot have been discussed to a large degree by doctrine1, analyzing a large spectrum of legal, political and 
                                                          
* Intervento ricevuto in occasione del convegno organizzato da federalismi “Brexit: ad un anno dal referendum, a che punto 
è la notte?”, Roma, 23 giugno 2017. 
1 On this issue, from a legal perspective, see ex multis T. ĆAPETA, Brexit and the EU Constitutional Order: A Three 
Act Tragedy, in Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy, vol. 12, 2016; B. CARAVITA, Brexit: Keep calm and apply 
the European Constitution, in Federalismi.it, n. 13/2016; B. DE WITTE, The United Kingdom: Towards exit from the EU or 
towards a different kind of membership?, in Quaderni Costituzionali, vol. 36, n. 3/2016; S. DOUGLAS-SCOTT, Brexit, 
Article 50 and the Contested British Constitution, in The Modern Law Review, vol. 79, n. 6/2016; P. EECKHOUT – E. 
FRANTZIOU, Brexit and Article 50 TEU: A Constitutionalist Reading, 2016, available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2889254 (accessed on 5 April 2017); M. GOLDONI – G. 
MARTINICO, Il ritiro della marea? Alcuni considerazioni giuridico-costituzionali sul c.d. Brexit, in Federalismi.it, n. 18/2016; 
A. GREEN, Why  the  EU  Referendum  Might  Be  Morally  Binding –A  Partial Response  to  Yossi  Nehushtan, in 
ukconstitutionallaw.org, 14 July 2016; H. HESTERMEYER, How Brexit Will Happen: A Brief Primer on European Union 
Law and Constitutional Law Questions Raised by Brexit, in Journal of International Arbitration, vol. 33, special issue, 2016; 
T. LOCK, A Lame Duck for a Member State? Thoughts on the UK’s Position in the EU after the Brexit Vote, in 
Verfassungsblog.de, 1 July 2016; C. MARTINELLI, I presupposti del referendum e i cleavages costituzionali aperti dalla Brexit, 
in Diritto Pubblico Comparato ed Europeo, n. 3/2016; Y. NEHUSHTAN, Why the  EU  Referendum’s  Result  Is  not  
 
 





economic issues. Moreover, British courts have been called to rule on the prerogatives of the 
Government and the devolved institutions in activating the procedure of withdrawal from the EU2. 
Eventually, art. 50 Treaty on European Union3 (TEU) was triggered on 29 March 2017 and therefore the 
                                                          
Morally-Politically Binding, in ukconstitutionallaw.org, 5 July 2016; R.A. WESSEL, You Can Check Out Any Time You Like, 
But Can You Really Leave? On ‘Brexit’ And Leaving International Organizations, in International Organisations Law Review, 
vol. 13, n. 2/2016; K.J. WRIGHT, Taking Back Control?: Appeals to the People in the Aftermath of the UK’s Referendum on 
EU Membership, in Costituzionalismo.it, n. 2/2016; A. YOUNG: Brexit, Article 50 and the ‘Joys’ of a Flexible, Evolving, 
Un-codified Constitution, in Ukconstitutionallaw.org, 1 July 2016. 
2 See, in particular, HIGH COURT OF NORTHERN IRELAND, QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION, McCord, Re 
Judicial Review and Agnew and Others v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union and Secretary of State for Northern 
Ireland, [2016] NIQB 85, 28 October 2016; HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE OF ENGLAND AND WALES, Miller 
and Dos Santos v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, [2016] EWHC 2768 (Admin), 3 November 2016; 
UNITED KINGDOM SUPREME COURT, R (on the application of Miller and Dos Santos) v. Secretary of State for 
Exiting the European Union, R (on the application of the Attorney General for Northern Ireland) v. Secretary of State for Exiting 
the European Union and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland ex parte Agnew and others, R (on the application of McCord) 
v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, [2017] UKSC 5, 24 January 
2017. For further analyses, among the rich doctrinal debate, see G. CARAVALE, A Family of Nations. Asimmetrie 
territoriali nel Regno Unito tra Devolution e Brexit, Naples, 2017, pp. 208-211; P. CRAIG, Miller, Structural Constitutional 
Review and the Limits of Prerogative Power, 2017, available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2955011 (accessed on 5 April 2017); M. DAWSON, Brexit 
in the Supreme Court: An Opportunity Missed?, in Verfassungsblog.de, 24 January 2017; M. ELLIOTT, The Supreme Court's 
Judgment in Miller: In Search of Constitutional Principle, in University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper, n. 23/2017; 
O. GARNER, Conditional Primacy of EU Law: The United Kingdom Supreme Court’s Own “Solange (so long as)” Doctrine?, 
in ukconstitutionallaw.org, 31 January 2017; J. KING – N. BARBER, In  Defence  of  Miller, in Ukconstitutionallaw.org, 22 
November 2016; R. O’CONNELL, Constitutional Law 101 Lessons: The Brexit Judgment on the Prerogative in R (Miller) 
v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, 2016, available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2864224 (accessed on 5 April 2017); F. ROSA, Westminster 
first, in DPCE online, n. 1/2017; D. SARMIENTO, Miller, Brexit and the (maybe not to so evil) Court of Justice, in 
Verfassungsblog.de, 8 November 2016; F. SGRÒ, Il caso “Brexit”: qualche considerazione sulla sovranità parlamentare e sul 
sistema delle fonti nell’ordinamento costituzionale britannico dopo la sentenza della Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, in 
Federalismi.it, n. 5/2017; J. WILLIAMS, The Supreme Court’s Approach  to  Prerogative  Powers  in  Miller:  An  Analysis  
of  Four  E’s, in Ukconstitutionallaw.org, 25 January 2017.   
3 For an in-depth analysis of art. 50 TEU, see ex multis M.E. BARTOLONI, La disciplina del recesso dall'Unione europea: 
una tensione mai sopita tra spinte “costituzionaliste” e resistenze “internazionaliste”, in Rivista AIC, n. 2/2016; R.J. FRIEL, 
Providing a Constitutional Framework for Withdrawal from the EU: Article 59 of the Draft European Constitution, in International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 53, n. 2/2004; J. HERBST, Observations on the Right to Withdraw from the European 
Union: Who are the “Masters of the Treaties”?, in German Law Journal, vol. 6, n. 11/2005; C. HILLION, Accession and 
Withdrawal in the Law of the European Union, in A. ARNULL – D. CHALMERS (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
European Union Law, Oxford, 2015; C. HILLION, Leaving the European Union, the Union way: A legal analysis of Article 
50 TEU, in European Policy Analysis, n. 8/2016; H. HOFMEISTER, Should I Stay or Should I Go? – A Critical Analysis 
of the Right to Withdraw from the EU, in European Law Journal, vol. 16, n. 5/2010; A. ŁAZOWSKI, Unilateral withdrawal 
from the EU: realistic scenario or a folly?, in Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 23, n. 9/2016; A. ŁAZOWSKI, 
Withdrawal from the European Union and Alternatives to Membership, in European Law Review, vol. 37, n. 5/2012; P. 
NICOLAIDES, Withdrawal from the European Union: A Typology of Effects, in Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law, vol. 20, n. 2/2013; M. PUGLIA, Art. 50 TUE, in A. TIZZANO (a cura di), Trattati sull’Unione 
europea, Milan, 2014; C.M. RIEDER, The withdrawal clause of the Lisbon Treaty in the light of EU Citizenship: Between 
Disintegration and Integration, in Fordham International Law Journal, vol. 37, n. 1/2014; F. SAVASTANO, Prime 
considerazioni sul diritto di recedere dall’Unione europea, in Federalismi.it, n. 22/2015; A. TATHAM, “Don’t Mention Divorce 
at the Wedding, Darling!” EU Accession and Withdrawal after Lisbon, in A. BIONDI – P. EECKHOUT – S. RIPLEY 
(eds.), EU Law after Lisbon, Oxford, 2012; M. VELLANO, Art. 50 TUE, in F. POCAR – M.C. BARUFFI (a cura 
di), Commentario breve ai Trattati dell’Unione europea, Padua, 2014; A. WYROZUMSKA, Withdrawal from the European 
 
 





United Kingdom is destined to leave the continental organization by March 2019, unless the European 
Council agrees unanimously to extend the negotiation period4.  
Several legal issues of utmost importance have emerged since the referendum held in June 2016, both at 
domestic and EU level: it is noteworthy to mention the drama on the prerogative powers in triggering art. 
50 TEU5 – eventually defined by the Supreme Court6 –, the preservation of the rights acquired by EU 
citizens as long-term residents in the United Kingdom7, the contested revocability of art. 50 TEU 
notification8, and the consequences of Brexit for Scotland and Northern Ireland.  
The aim of this article is to assess the main consequences of the process for the two aforementioned 
entities of the United Kingdom, analyzing whether and up to which extent a differentiated Brexit – if not 
the very exclusion from the withdrawal process – might relieve the burden and the uncertainties related 
to peculiar situation of the two regions. Therefore, the specific situations arising in Scotland and Northern 
Ireland will be separately assessed. The first scenario is deeply interconnected with the long-dated political 
struggle for a Scottish independence and, as such, must consider the issues deriving from self-
determination theories, as well as the domestic devolution provisions; the latter, conversely, is linked with 
the lex specialis regime consequent to the 1998 “Good Friday Agreement”, composed of an international 
treaty between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland and a separate agreement involving most 
                                                          
Union, in H.-J. BLANKE – S. MANGIAMELI (eds.), The European Union after Lisbon, Heidelberg, Dordrecht, 
London, New York, 2012.   
4 According to the provision set by art. 50, par. 3 TEU.  
5 See K. ARMSTRONG, Push Me, Pull You: Whose Hand on the Article 50 Trigger?, in Ukconstitutionallaw.org, 27 June 
2016; P. CRAIG, Miller, Structural Constitutional Review, cit.; R. CRAIG, Casting Aside Clanking Medieval Chains: 
Prerogative, Statute and Article 50 after the EU Referendum, in The Modern Law Review, vol. 79, n. 6/2016; G. 
PHILLIPSON, A Dive into Deep Constitutional Waters: Article 50, the Prerogative and Parliament, in The Modern Law 
Review, vol. 79, n. 6/2016; L. VIOLINI, L’avvio di brexit nella contesa tra Parliamentary Sovereignty e Royal Prerogative 
Powers, in Rivista AIC, n. 1/2017. 
6 See supra, note 2. 
7 See P. ATHANASSIOU – S. LAULHÈ SHAELOU, EU Citizenship and Its Relevance to EU Exit and Secession, in 
D. KOCHENOV (ed.), EU Citizenship and Federalism: the Role of Rights, Cambridge, 2017; M.E. BARTOLONI, La 
disciplina del recesso dall'Unione europea, cit.; S. DOUGLAS-SCOTT, What Happens to Acquired Rights in the Event of 
Brexit?, in ukconstitutionallaw.org, 16 May 2016; D. KOCHENOV, Brexit and Citizenship, in Verfassungsblog.de, 20 June 
2016; P. MINDUS, European Citizenship after Brexit. Freedom of Movement and Rights of Residence, 2017; P. SANDRO, 
Like a Bargaining Chip: Enduring the Unsettled Status of EU Nationals Living in the UK, in Verfassungsblog.de, 13 July 2016. 
8 The notification seems to be revocable according to a relevant share of doctrine; however, such possibility has 
been clearly denied by the Supreme Court (see supra, note 2). For further analysis, see C. CLOSA, Interpreting Article 
50: exit and voice and what about loyalty?, in RSCAS Working Paper, n. 71/2016; C. CLOSA, Is Article 50 Reversible? On 
Politics Beyond Legal Doctrine, in Verfassungsblog.de, 4 January 2017; A. MIGLIO, La revocabilità della notifica ex art. 50 
TUE, in Federalismi.it, n. 18/2016; E. PISTOIA, Sul periodo intercorrente tra la notifica del recesso e la cessazione della 
partecipazione del Regno unito all’Unione europea, in diritticomparati.it, 27 April 2017; P. SANDRO, Of course you can still 
turn back! On the revocability of the Article 50 notification and post-truth politics, in Verfassungsblog.de, 19 April 2017; A. SARI, 
Reversing a Withdrawal Notification under Article 50 TEU: Can the Member States Change Their Mind?, in Exeter Law School 
Working Paper, n. 1/2016; D. SARMIENTO, Miller, Brexit and the (maybe not to so evil), cit.  
 
 





of Northern Ireland’s political parties9. Moreover, in both regions several intermediate models have been 
proposed in order to mitigate the effects of an “hard Brexit”10: while their effective practicability – due 
to legal and political restraints – does not seem to be an easy task, they make a significant starting point 
for a theoretical analysis on the consequences of the withdrawal process in Scotland and Northern 
Ireland.  
 
2. The future of Scotland between self-determination and European Economic Area accession 
2.1. Brief overview on self-determination theories 
Before assessing the Scottish scenario, it is necessary to briefly introduce the legal implications of the 
principle of self-determination. While an in-depth analysis on the historical and recent evolution of such 
principle is out of the scope of the present article11, a brief overview of its most prominent legal elements 
is, nonetheless, particularly significant.  
                                                          
9 Both agreements are available at http://peacemaker.un.org/uk-ireland-good-friday98 (accessed on 15 May 2017). 
For a doctrinal overview, see C. BELL – K. CAVANAUGH, ‘Constructive Ambiguity’ or Internal Self-Determination? – 
Self-Determination, Group Accommodation, and the Belfast Agreement, in Fordham International Law Journal, vol. 22, n. 
4/1999; G. CARAVALE, A Family of Nations., cit., pp. 117-140; B. HADFIELD, The Belfast Agreement, Sovereignty 
and the State of the Union, in Public Law, n. 4/1998; R. MAC GINTY, Constitutional referendums and ethnonational conflict: 
the case of Northern Ireland, in Nationalism and Ethnic Policies, vol. 9, n. 2/2003; C. MCCRUDDEN, Northern Ireland, the 
Belfast Agreement, and the British Constitution, in J. JOWELL – D. OLIVER (eds.), The Changing Constitution, Oxford, 
2004; A. MORGAN, The Belfast Agreement: A practical legal analysis, Belfast, 2000; J. MORISON, Constitutionalism and 
Change: Representation, Governance and Participation in the New Northern Ireland, in Fordham International Law Journal, vol. 
22, n. 4/1999; B. O’LEARY, The Nature of the Agreement, in Fordham International Law Journal, vol. 22, n. 4/1999; C. 
WARBRICK – D. MCGOLDRICK – G. GILBERT, The Northern Ireland Peace Agreement, Minority Rights and Self-
Determination, in International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 47, n. 4/1998; R. WILFORD (ed.), Aspects of the 
Belfast agreement, Oxford, 2001. 
10 The term commonly indicates a withdrawal arrangement “[…] in which the United Kingdom stops being a member of the 
European single market and gets full control of its own law-making and immigration.” 
(http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/hard-brexit - accessed on 10 July 2017).  
11 On this issue, see G. ARANGIO-RUIZ, Autodeterminazione dei popoli e diritto internazionale: Dalla Carta delle Nazioni 
Unite all'Atto di Helsinki (CSCE), in Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali, vol. 50, n. 4/1983; G. ARANGIO-RUIZ, 
Autodeterminazione (diritto dei popoli alla), in Enciclopedia giuridica, Rome, 1988; P. BERNARDINI, Autodeterminazione e 
sovranità: un ragionamento critico, Teramo, 2005; Y. BLUM, Reflections on the Changing Concept of Self-Determination, in Israel 
Law Review, vol. 10, n. 4/1975; A. CASSESE, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal, Cambridge, 1995; J. 
CASTELLINO, International law and self-determination, The Hague, 2000; C. CHRISTAKIS, Le droit à 
l’autodétermination en dehors des situations de décolonisation, Marseille, 1999; A. COBBAN, The Nation State and National 
Self Determination, New York, 1970; J. CRAWFORD (ed.), The rights of peoples, Oxford, 1988; M. DISTEFANO (a 
cura di), Il principio di autodeterminazione dei popoli alla prova del nuovo millennio, Padua, 2014; D. FRENCH (ed.), Statehood 
and Self-Determination, Cambridge, 2015; E. GAYIM, The principle of self-determination: a study of its historical and 
contemporary legal evolution, Oslo, 1988; G. GUARINO, Autodeterminazione dei popoli e diritto internazionale, Naples, 1984; 
H. HANNUM, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination, Philadelphia, 1990; K. KNOP, Diversity and self-
determination in international law, Cambridge, 2002; G. PALMISANO, Nazioni Unite e autodeterminazione interna. Il 
principio alla luce degli strumenti rilevanti dell’ONU, Milan, 1997; M. POMERANCE, Self-Determination in Law and Practice, 
The Hague, 1982; A. RIGO SUREDA, The evolution of the right of self-determination: a study of United Nations practice, 
Leiden, 1973; M. STERIO, The Right to Self-Determination under International Law, Abingdon, New York, 2015; P. 
THORNBERRY, Self-determination, minorities, human rights: a review of international instruments, in International and 
 
 





The clearest explanation of the manifold implications of the aforementioned principle in the post-
decolonization era comes from a domestic court. Answering to a reference question submitted by the 
federal Government on the existence of a right to self-determination enjoyable by the Québécois people – 
an issue, mutatis mutandis, comparable to the Scottish saga12 –, in 1998 the Supreme Court of Canada had 
the opportunity to clarify the extension and the invocability of such right. It “[…] is normally fulfilled through 
internal self-determination — a people’s pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development within the 
framework of an existing [S]tate. A right to external self-determination (which in this case potentially takes the form of the 
assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises in only the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined 
circumstances. […]”13     
These circumstances are well defined either by international or constitutional law. The first group includes 
the processes of decolonization14, any situations where “[…] a people is subject to alien subjugation, domination 
or exploitation outside a colonial context […]”15 and – although contested by a relevant fraction of the legal 
doctrine – the so-called “remedial secession” of peoples “[…] blocked form the meaningful exercise of its right 
to self-determination internally […]”16. Conversely, the latter category includes any domestic provisions – 
                                                          
comparative law quarterly, vol. 38, n. 4/1989; C. TOMUSCHAT (ed.), Modern Law of Self Determination, Dordrecht, 
1993; O.U. UMOZURIKE, Self-Determination in International Law, London, 1972; M. WELLER, Escaping the Self-
determination Trap, Leiden, Boston, 2008. 
12 For an analysis on such parallelism, see G. CARAVALE, A Family of Nations., op. cit., pp. 59-68. 
13 SUPREME COURT OF CANADA, Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217, 20 August 1998, par. 134. 
For a doctrinal analysis on the milestone advisory opinion on self-determination, see P. DUMBERRY, Lessons 
Learned from the Quebec Secession Reference Before the Supreme Court of Canada, in M.G. KOHEN, Secession: International 
Law Perspectives, Cambridge, 2006; T. GROPPI, Concezioni della democrazia e della constituzione nella decisione della Corte 
Suprema del Canada sulla secessione del Quebec, in Giurisprudenza Costituzionale, vol. 43, 1998; J.T. MCHUGH, Making 
Public Law ‘Public’: An Analysis of the Quebec Reference Case and its Significance for Comparative Constitutional Analysis, in 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 49, n. 2/2000; W.J. NEWMAN, The Quebec Secession Reference: The 
Rules of Law and the Position of the Attorney General of Canada, Toronto, 1999; P. OLIVER, Canada's Two Solitudes: 
Constitutional and International Law in Reference re Secession of Quebec, in International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 
vol. 6, n. 1/1999; P. PASSAGLIA, Corte Suprema del Canada, Parere 20 agosto 1998, Pres. Lamer, Renvoi relatif à la 
sécession du Québec, in Il Foro Italiano, vol. 122, n. 6/1999; D. SCHNEIDERMAN (ed.), The Quebec Decision. Perspectives 
on the Supreme Court Ruling on Secession, Toronto, 1999; G. VAN ERT, International Recognition in the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s Reference, in Canadian Yearbook of International Law, vol. 35, 1998; J. WOEHRLING, L’avis de la Cour suprême 
du Canada sur l’éventuelle sécession du Québec, in Revue française de droit constitutionel, vol. 37, 1999. 
14 See SUPREME COURT OF CANADA, Reference re Secession of Quebec, cit., par. 132. 
15 Ibidem, par. 133. 
16 Ibidem, par. 134. On the admissibility of remedial secession, see also INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 
JUSTICE, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Separate 
Opinion of Judge Cançado Trinidade, in I.C.J. Reports 2010, par. 175-176. For a doctrinal analysis, see K. DEL 
MAR, The myth of remedial secession, in D. FRENCH (ed.), Statehood and Self-Determination. Reconciling Tradition and 
Modernity in International Law, Cambridge, 2013; C. GRIFFIOEN, Self-determination as a Human Right: The Emergency 
Exit of Remedial Secession, Utrecht, 2010; T.W. SIMON, Remedial Secession: What the Law Should Have Done, from Katanga 
to Kosovo, in Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, vol. 40, n. 1/2011; A. TANCREDI, Secessione e diritto 
internazionale: un’analisi del dibattito, in Diritto Pubblico Comparato ed Europeo, n. 2/2015; S. VAN DEN DRIEST, 
Remedial Secession: A Right to External Self-Determination as a Remedy to Serious Injustices?, Antwerp, 2013; J. VIDMAR, 
Remedial Secession in International Law: Theory and (Lack of) Practice, in St. Antony’s International Review, vol. 6, n. 1/2010. 
 
 





generally, but not necessarily, at a constitutional level – enabling a specific people or group of citizens to 
separate17 from the rest of the parent nation in order to establish a new State in the territory where they 
are settled. Such right was typically granted – although often only de jure – in the constitutional systems 
of several socialist States18, but some examples are still present nowadays19.   
 
2.2. Scottish independence: feasibility and consequences 
It is clearly evident how the first group of factors legitimizing self-determination cannot be applied to the 
Scottish scenario: every pro-independence effort must therefore be founded on domestic law. On this 
purpose, the 1998 Scotland Act includes the Union of Scotland and England among the so-called 
“reserved matters”, on which the British Parliament maintains its full sovereignty and the Scottish 
Parliament cannot legislate for. However, Section 30(2) of the aforementioned act reads: “Her majesty may 
by Order in Council make any modifications of Schedule 4 or 5 [ – reserved matters – ] which She considers necessary 
or expedient.” It implies that, following a specific order issued by HM Privy Council and previously 
approved by both Houses in the British Parliament as well as by the Scottish Parliament, London can 
temporarily devolve additional powers to Edinburgh, empowering its legislative body to legislate for an 
independence referendum. This was the framework enabling the referendum held in 2014, following the 2012 
“Agreement between the United Kingdom Government and the Scottish Government on a referendum 
on independence for Scotland” (“Edinburgh Agreement”)20.  
                                                          
17 International law discerns between “separation” and “secession” in so far as the first term indicates a process 
leading to the creation of a sovereign independent entity consensually recognized by the parent State, while the 
latter term is to testify unilateralism in place of the aforementioned consensual element. On this issue, see J. 
CRAWFORD, State practice and international law in relation to secession, in The British Year Book of International Law, vol. 
69, 1998, pp. 85-86; J. CRAWFORD, The Creation of States in International Law, Oxford, 2006, distinguishing – in the 
same legal terms – between “devolution” and “secession”.   
18 In particular, it was granted to each federated republic in the USSR and in the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia.  
19 Inter alia, it was granted by the 2003 Constitution of the Union of Serbia and Montenegro to both entities and 
has been effectively exercised by Montenegro in 2006. A similar right to separation is still recognized by the Uzbek 
Constitution to the Autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan and by the Ethiopian Constitution to each people 
and nationality settled in the State. For a general analysis, see J.O. FROSINI – F. RINALDI, L’avverarsi della 
“condizione sospensiva” costituzionale per l’esercizio dello ius secessionis in Serbia-Montenegro, in Diritto Pubblico Comparato ed 
Europeo, n. 4/2006; A. HABTU, Multiethnic Federalism in Ethiopia: A Study of the Secession Clause in the Constitution, in 
Publius, vol. 35, n. 2/2005; S. MANCINI, Costituzionalismo, federalismo e secessione, in Istituzioni del Federalismo, n. 
4/2014; S. MANCINI, Il Montenegro e la democrazia della secessione, in Quaderni Costituzionali, n. 1/2007; M. SUKSI, On 
the Voluntary Re-definition of Status of a Sub-state Entity: The Historical Example of Finland and the Modern Example of Serbia 
and Montenegro, in Faroese Law Review, vol. 45, n. 4/2004; J. VIDMAR, Montenegro’s Path to Independence: A Study of Self-
Determination, Statehood and Recognition, in  Hanse Law Review, vol. 3, n. 1/2007. 
20 The full text of the “Edinburgh Agreement” is available at 
http://www.gov.scot/About/Government/concordats/Referendum-on-independence (accessed on 9 April 
2017). For further analysis, see ex multis E.C. ADAM, The Independence Referendum and Debates on Scotland's Constitutional 
Future, in Tijdschrift voor Constitutioneel Recht, n. 2/2014; A. MCHARG, The Legal Effects of the Edinburgh Agreement – 
 
 





Such a relevant precedent deserves to be taken in great consideration for the purposes of any post-Brexit 
analyses. While a majority of the voters expressed itself against the separation of Scotland from the United 
Kingdom, the then perspective of losing EU membership proved to be significant in determining a 
willingness to keep the status quo unaltered. On this issue, the impossibility to maintain the membership 
of the EU in the event of a separation – and the consequent need to reapply according to the terms 
provided by art. 49 TEU21 – has been shared by a relevant fraction of the legal doctrine22. On the same 
terms, moreover, the then President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy, in relation to the 
comparable Catalan issue23, stated that “[t]he separation of one part of a Member State or the creation of a new State 
would not be neutral as regards the EU Treaties. The European Union has been established by the relevant treaties among 
the Member States. If a part of the territory of a Member State ceases to be part of that [S]tate because that territory becomes 
                                                          
Again, in Scottishconstitutionalfutures.org, 8 November 2012; S. TIERNEY, Legal issues surrounding the referendum on 
independence for Scotland, in European Constitutional Law Review, vol. 9, n. 3/2013. 
21 For a general analysis on art. 49 TEU, see D. BIFULCO, Com’è facile dirsi europei…Spunti di riflessione circa l’art. 49 
del Trattato UE e l’allargamento dell’Unione europea agli Stati dell’Europa centro-orientale, in Rassegna di diritto pubblico europeo, 
n. 1, 2005; S. FORTUNATO, Article 49 [Accession to the Union], in H.J. BLANKE – S. MANGIAMELI (eds.), The 
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Fordham International Law Journal, vol. 36, n. 5/13.    
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a new independent [S]tate, the treaties will no longer apply to that territory. In other words, a new independent [S]tate 
would, by the fact of its independence, become a third country with respect to the Union and the treaties would, from the day 
of its independence, not apply anymore on its territory.”24 
Discharging any hypothesis allowing the separating State to remain in the EU without discontinuity, the 
very essence of art. 49 TEU acquires a central role: it is, as a matter of facts, crucial to remember that in 
order to admit a new member, inter alia, the Council of the EU is called to approve the enlargement 
unanimously; eventually, an admission treaty has to be concluded and ratified by all States involved (the 
parties to the Treaties and the acceding State). Moreover, such interpretation is confirmed by general 
international law. While art. 34 of the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of 
Treaties – although ratified by a limited number of States25 – confirms that “[…] any treaty in force at the 
date of the succession of States in respect of the entire territory of the predecessor State continues in force in respect of each 
successor State […]”26, art. 4 of the same Convention specifies that it applies “[…] without prejudice to the rules 
concerning acquisition of membership and without prejudice to any other relevant rules of the organization.”27 
Therefore, it is possible to identify two relevant matters: i) the assent of the parent State and ii) the 
involvement of other member States dealing with secessionist movements. The first question appeared 
to be meaningful in 2014 – when Brexit had yet to become a solid option on the table – but it does not 
seem to be equally significant nowadays. It comes uncontested that an hypothetical sovereign Scotland 
will not be stopped on its road towards EU membership by the United Kingdom once Brexit is 
completed. Moreover, the debate about an active role to be played by the EU in preventing and 
discouraging secessionist claims within member States through blocking the admission of successfully-
formed new States, already contested by a fraction of the legal doctrine, is clearly irrelevant in a post-
Brexit scenario.28   
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Conversely, the latter issue is still crucial, on the ground that several European countries generally 
maintain a strict approach towards secessionist entities due to domestic or geopolitical factors, no matters 
whether or not the parent State belongs to the EU. A clear example is the official recognition of Kosovo, 
whose statehood is still contested, almost ten years after its unilateral declaration of independence, among 
others by five EU States – namely Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain. Madrid, in particular, 
proved to be unready to welcome an independent Scotland in the so-called “European club”, possibly 
due to the fear of further legitimizing the pro-independence movements in Catalonia, before adopting a 
more conciliatory position in the last few months29.       
It is now evident how the perspective of maintaining or reacquiring the status of EU member State for 
an independent Scotland is particularly challenging: in brief, it would require finding a majority in 
Westminster in favor of a new Section 30 order – and the current ruling party does not seem available to 
reconsider the Scottish issue before completing the negotiations with the EU –, holding a repetition of 
the unsuccessful 2014 referendum and – if and when sovereignty is acquired – apply for EU accession, 
joining the queue of several candidate States. On the last condition, it is important to remark that, while 
Scotland is in a privileged position for what concerns the adaptation of domestic law to the acquis 
communautaire, it would be unreasonable to expect a “fast track” on the procedure provided by art. 49 
TEU. Moreover, according to the evolution of the conditionality recorded in the enlargement processes 
started in the last two decades30, new member States are not allowed to exercise opting-out clauses on 
several elements of the acquis: such is the case, inter alia, of the Schengen agreement31. 
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2.3. Acceding to the European Economic Area: a valid compromise?   
The obstacles for an independent Scotland on the road to the EU are evident and they are likely to stand 
still even in the long term, when Brexit will be a fait accompli. Aware of the situation, the Scottish 
Government drafted last December a plan for a territorially differentiated Brexit, allowing the entity to 
remain within the European Single Market (ESM). In brief, the document advocated the adoption of an 
ad hoc solution – the so-called “Norwegian option” – for Scotland: the region, while remaining part of 
the United Kingdom, would autonomously adhere to the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) and 
eventually to the European Economic Area (EEA)32.  
The technicalities related to the achievement of such project are out of the scope of the present article33, 
but it is necessary to highlight how it would be up to the British Government to negotiate and, eventually, 
to allow the implementation of the Scottish plan. Specifically, the United Kingdom should apply for 
EFTA membership and, eventually, restrict the territorial application of the EEA Agreement to the sole 
Scotland34. As admitted in the proposal, it is evident that a positive conclusion would require the 
willingness to compromise from all sides involved, both at a domestic and a European level35. 
Anyway, it is important to remark how such solution would allow the ESM provisions to be still 
applicable ratione loci in Scotland. For what concerns the free movement of goods, while the region would 
be outside the EU customs union – altogether with the rest of the United Kingdom – “[…] remaining 
within the single market would give Scottish businesses a comparative advantage over those in other parts of the UK that 
would be outside both the customs union and the single market.”36 Moreover, the administrative border between 
Scotland and England would not become an international nor an EU external border. 
However, the Scottish plan is not exempt from critics. First of all, it is not explained how it is possible to 
determine whether or not a specific person is eligible for the free movement regime. If it is uncontested 
that workers coming from a State part of the ESM could freely move to Scotland – while restrictions are 
likely to apply for any post-Brexit movements towards the rest of the United Kingdom –, how can the 
Scottish workers allowed to reestablish in a State part of the ESM be properly qualified? Objective criteria 
are necessary in order to prevent abusive situations (i.e. a British citizen changing his legal residence to 
Scotland immediately before exercising the right of free movement to an EEA or EU member State), but 
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the proposal is silent on this issue. Anyway, the imposition of temporary restrictions on British citizens 
resettling in Scotland and acquiring the “Scottish citizenship”, a framework comparable to what has been 
implemented in Finland in relation to the Åland Islands37, appears to be an unavoidable prerequisite for 
the actualization of the plan. Similarly, controls efficient enough to prevent EU workers coming into 
Scotland with the sole purpose of crossing the internal border with England and, therefore, 
circumventing the more restrictive immigration discipline to be enforced in the rest of the United 
Kingdom, would be equally necessary. 
Lastly, the effective implementation of the Scottish proposal would require a huge shift of competences 
from Westminster to Holyrood, allowing the region to enter into international relations with foreign 
States38 and to acquire the necessary jurisdiction to deal with the obligations deriving from ESM 
membership. While several models can be found even in the European legal space – Flanders and 
Wallonia in Belgium, as well as the German Lander, are noticeable examples –, such arrangement would 
deeply impact on the constitutional order of the United Kingdom, transforming the State in a sort of 
asymmetric federation39.     
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3. Irish unification or differentiated integration: mitigating the effects of an “hard Brexit” in 
Northern Ireland 
3.1. The legal framework for a united Ireland 
Introducing the domestic legal sources enabling a people to exercise the external dimension of the right 
of external self-determination40, a sui generis legal source has been purposely omitted. According to the 
already mentioned “Good Friday Agreement”, the parties commit themselves to recognize “[…] whatever 
choice […] freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland with regard to its status, whether they prefer to 
continue to support the Union with Great Britain or a sovereign united Ireland”41. Basically, a referendum should be 
organized “[…] if at any time it appears likely to [the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland] that a majority of 
those voting would express a wish that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a 
united Ireland.”42         
As a consequence of the agreement, inter alia, two articles of the Irish Constitution were amended: the 
new article 3 is of utmost importance for the scope of the present analysis, as it clarifies that “[…] a united 
Ireland shall be brought about only by peaceful means with the consent of a majority of the people, democratically expressed, 
in both jurisdictions in the island.”43 Therefore, the Northern Irish people holds a domestically recognized 
right to separate from the United Kingdom. Such right, however, is not unconditioned: the outcome of 
the process cannot consist in the creation of a new independent State but, necessarily, either in the entity 
being annexed to the Republic of Ireland or in the preservation of the status quo; moreover, the annexation 
also has to be approved by the Irish people, through a separate referendum. 
It is uncontested that the successful conclusion of such procedure would implicate a simple acquisition 
of territory to the advantage of the Republic of Ireland, while every thesis arguing the creation of a new 
State following the merging of the two sides of the island is manifestly unfounded. This because a “[…] 
presumption of continuity is particularly strong where the constitutional system of the State prior to acquisition […] continues 
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in force.”44 From an international law perspective, the annexation of Northern Ireland would be 
comparable, mutatis mutandis, to the German reunification45, the sole relevant difference being the 
incorporation of a territorial entity of a third State rather than the entire territory of a sovereign State. 
Anyway, as in the 1990 precedent, the outcome would clearly consist in the enlarged continuation of an 
existing State, rather than in the creation of a successor State.  
Therefore, taken into consideration such theoretical analysis, the call made by the former Taoiseach46 Enda 
Kenny for a specific provision in any Brexit agreement allowing Northern Ireland to be easily readmitted 
to the EU should the island be unified47 appears nothing but a pleonastic declaration. This because the 
Treaties would be applicable to the entire Irish territory immediately after the incorporation of the 
northern entity – in conformity with the German precedent48 – according to the provision set by art. 52 
TEU49. Consequently, it seems inappropriate to regulate the post-Brexit relations between Northern 
Ireland and the EU through the so-called “Cypriot model”50, and to provide a legal framework for an 
                                                          
44 J. CRAWFORD, The Creation of States in International Law, cit., p. 673. For a detailed study on the issue, see ex 
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immediate applicability of the Treaties in the entity should a unification of the island happen in the 
future51.   
While an alteration of the international status of Northern Ireland according to the provisions of the 
“Good Friday Agreement” would clearly bring the entity back within the sphere of application of the 
Treaties, it is, however, necessary to report that the former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland 
Theresa Villiers, in response to a call made by the Irish nationalist party Sinn Féin, declared that “[…] 
there is nothing to indicate that there is a majority support for a pool”52.  
Anyway, the severe impact of an “hard Brexit” on the economy in Northern Ireland is quite evident, as 
the area might suffer from trade restrictions and customs barriers on the border with the Republic of 
Ireland like no other regions of the United Kingdom, for obvious geographical reasons. In brief, 
economic analyses reported that the imposition of a physical barrier within the island is likely to be a 
huge burden on both sides: in particular, the Republic of Ireland is the first market for Northern Irish 
goods, accounting for more than thirty-four per cent of the entity’s total export and twenty-six per cent 
of the entity’s total import53, and severe trade restrictions might cause as much as a three per cent yearly 
reduction in the region’s GDP in the short term54. Moreover, systematic border checks would greatly 
affect the work market, as it is reported that more than thirty thousand workers commute cross-border 
every day to reach their workplace55.  Lastly, with due regard to the negative effects on the communities 
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53 See HM REVENUE AND CUSTOMS, Regional Trade Statistics 2015, p. 20 and 22, available at 
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living close to the boundary, while it seems inappropriate to fear any security-related consequence, the 
effects of an “hard Brexit” are likely to be considered as a step back on the normalization of the relations 
between nationalists and unionists.   
 
3.2. Differentiated integration  
Due to the aforementioned reasons, the paradigm of differentiated integration might become an useful 
tool to handle the Northern Irish issue. The necessity to find an agreement on the future status of the 
entity has also been acknowledged by the British Government in its “Brexit White Paper”, recognizing  
“[…] that for the people of Northern Ireland and Ireland, the ability to move freely across the border is an essential part of 
daily life. When the UK leaves the EU we aim to have as seamless and frictionless a border as possible between Northern 
Ireland and Ireland, so that we can continue to see the trade and everyday movements we have seen up to now.”56 
Several models could be drafted and applied to Northern Ireland in order to achieve such goal. An 
immediate solution could consist in the implementation of a paradigm inspired to the historical precedent 
of Greenland, an autonomous country that opted to withdraw from the then European Communities in 
spite of being subjected to the sovereignty of a member State – the Kingdom of Denmark. In brief, 
following the outcome of a referendum held in the entity in 1982, the 1985 “Treaty Amending, with Regard 
to Greenland, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities” removed the autonomous country 
from the range of application ratione loci of the Treaties and listed it as an associated territory (now under 
article 204 TFEU)57. 
However, there are several good reasons explaining how the application of a similar framework is 
unfeasible in the present case. Firstly, it would be the negative of the historical precedent, as only a 
marginal fraction of the United Kingdom – in terms of population and economic output – would remain 
within the EU: coherently, the model has been defined as “reverse Greenland”58. Moreover, politically 
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speaking, such model is incompatible with the slogan “Brexit means Brexit”, as the UK would formally 
remain an EU member State, the Treaties not being open for ratification by sub-State entities. 
Consequently, there would still be British representatives in every EU institution, such as in the European 
Council and in the Council of the EU – likely to be, respectively, the First Minister of Northern Ireland 
and a member of his executive –, as well as some members of the European Parliament elected in the 
entity. Moreover, from a legal perspective, art. 50 TEU is not the appropriate provision to implement a 
model that formally consists in a revision of the Treaties – regulated by art. 48 TEU59 – rather than the 
withdrawal of a member State from the EU. This would imply, inter alia, reopening the discussion on the 
revocability of the art. 50 TEU notification once transmitted to the European Council60. 
Acknowledging that the effective implementation of the “reverse Greenland” framework is little more 
than utopia, it is, however, important to highlight how it should be able to guarantee the free movement 
of goods and persons on the border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. Moreover, 
the rest of the United Kingdom would enjoy a preferential access to the ESM, with no duties on the 
goods originally produced in that part of the State, according to the provision set by art. 200 TFEU. 
An alternative model of differentiated integration could be inspired by the legal framework regulating the 
relations between the Faroe Islands and the EU. Benefiting from the status of autonomous country within 
of the Kingdom of Denmark61, they are excluded from the range of application ratione loci of the Treaties, 
according to the provision set by art. 355, par. 5, TFEU. As a consequence, the archipelago is not part 
of the ESM, the four EU “fundamental freedoms” cannot be unconditionally exercised in relation to the 
entity, and Danish citizens residing in the Faroe Islands do not qualify for EU citizenship. However, the 
Faroese have been allowed to trade duty-free with Denmark, on the condition that the goods are destined 
to final consumption in the country, since the latter joined the European Communities in 1972; any 
further exportation from Denmark to other member States was subjected to customs duties62. Since then, 
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taking advantage of extensive autonomy in international trade issues, the Faroese managed to conclude 
several trade agreements with the EU so that, presently, all EU goods but dairy products and sheep meat 
are allowed duty-free into the Faroe Islands; conversely, a large share of Faroese export is allowed duty-
free into the EU, the only notable exception being related to the agricultural sector.63 
For what concerns the movement of persons, the archipelago does not belong to the so-called “Schengen 
area”, but it is part of the Nordic Passport Union (altogether with Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland and 
Denmark): it implies no preferential rights for the Faroese to establish into the EU and vice-versa, with 
the notable exception of the aforementioned Nordic countries and their citizens. However, Faroese – 
holding Danish citizenship – could still bypass such restriction by moving their residence into mainland 
Denmark before exercising the freedoms granted by EU law. Moreover, while a valid travel document is 
compulsory for all foreigners landing in the archipelago, persons travelling between the Faroe Islands 
and any other country part of the Nordic Passport Union are not subjected to systematic border checks 
by the local immigration authorities64. 
Relevant doctrine analyzed the Faroese situation in order to draw a valid model to assess the post-Brexit 
relations between Scotland, the rest of the United Kingdom and the EU65. Recognizing the importance 
of the aforementioned study, in the opinion of the person writing the “Faroese model” would be much 
more appropriate to inspire a feasible accommodation for the issue of Northern Ireland. Such assertion 
rests on a critical element identified in the original proposal: “[a]fter Brexit, Scotland will no longer be part of a 
union which is an EU member state. Conversely, the fact that Denmark is an EU member state is likely to have had a 
positive influence in the EU’s relations with the Faroes.”66 For what concerns Northern Ireland, the 
aforementioned “positive influence” could be identified in the special relation – reinforced by the “Good 
Friday Agreement” – with the Republic of Ireland, clearly an EU member State.  
It is noteworthy to report that Northern Irish citizens are entitled to hold both British and Irish 
citizenship: according to the 2011 census, almost twenty-one per cent of the entity’s residents had an 
Irish passport67 and the application ratio has boosted in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum68. 
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Concerning the free movement of persons, the preservation of the status quo – namely the Common 
Travel Area69 – is at first glance a guarantee against the imposition of immigration controls between the 
two sides of the island. However, it is necessary to highlight that, while the permanence of the Republic 
of Ireland in the regional free-travel agreement should not be at risk, Dublin’s authorities might be called 
to perform extended checks even on EU citizens in order to avoid any circumvention of the British 
immigration provisions through the Irish territory. This last issue, anyway, is likely to be incompatible 
with the Treaties unless a lex specialis regime is introduced into EU primary law by the recession treaty70. 
For what concerns the movement of goods, two options might be taken into consideration: i) an in-depth 
revision of the competences of Northern Ireland, allowing the entity to enter into international 
agreements autonomously or ii) a more extensive agreement with the EU in the framework of art. 50 
TEU negotiations, possibly through EEA membership71, allowing the entity to remain within the ESM. 
The first solution is the closest to the Faroese model: the entity, once acquired devolved powers in 
international trade and an autonomous international subjectivity, could negotiate with the EU the 
implementation of a free movement regime for goods produced or destined to final consumption in the 
entity, avoiding the imposition of an “hard border” with systematic customs checks on travelers and 
commuters. A challenging issue would be, in this regard, to implement a mechanism aimed at preventing 
any frauds on the effective origin of British goods.  
The latter option might incur the same criticism reported above in relation to the Scottish Government’s 
proposal. However, it is important to remember the peculiarities of the Northern Irish situation: while 
the Scottish plan was inspired solely by political motivations, a specific arrangement for the Irish entity 
is necessary due to its uniqueness in geographical – being the only part of the United Kingdom, apart 
from Gibraltar, sharing a land border with another EU member State and being detached from the rest 
of the State –, economic, and socio-political terms; moreover, the fact that its devolution arrangement – 
underpinned in a binding bilateral treaty between London and Dublin – assumes that the two countries 
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are members of the EU is equally a key element of the issue not to be disregarded.72 For these reasons, a 
greater exercise of flexibility from all actors involved should be necessary in order to overcome the harsh 
effects of an “hard Brexit” on the entity.  
 
4. Conclusions 
The models recalled in this article make only a few of the several legal frameworks available to 
accommodate the requests for a differentiated Brexit arising in Scotland and Northern Ireland. It is, 
however, necessary to always consider the limits and procedures deriving from international and domestic 
law. Therefore, a repetition of the 2014 independence referendum in Scotland might be viable – once 
obtained the necessary consensus in Westminster – but, even in case of a positive outcome, it does not 
imply an easy road back to Brussels. Pragmatically, it is has to be noticed that the Scottish Nationalists 
(SNP) lost as much as twenty-one seats in the House of Commons following last June’s general elections73 
and their pro-independence efforts do not seem to be particularly successful, as recent opinion polls 
predict a solid majority in favor of the status quo should the 2014 referendum be hypothetically repeated74. 
Nonetheless, it will not be an easy task to find a new agreement between Edinburgh and London on a 
framework for Scottish independence, unless the seats held by the SNP are necessary to a major party – 
such as the Labour – in order to form a majority in Westminster upholding a coalition Government after 
the next general elections. In such an unlikely circumstance, a new referendum in Scotland might be the 
necessary trade-off for upholding the executive; conversely, any ruling party is not to be blamed for 
vetoing such perspective, as the territorial integrity of a sovereign State is not a matter to be questioned 
every other year.  
Moreover, for the scope of the present article it is necessary to remind that an immediate consequence 
of independence would be the imposition of an “hard barrier” between England and Scotland, with 
systematic customs checks and possible immigration controls as well. The implementation of some 
models of differentiated integration – such as the EEA membership – might prevent those negative 
effects, but it seems that a similar policy is equally unable to gather the necessary political consensus in 
Westminster and therefore its feasibility is yet to be demonstrated. Until then, Edinburgh should settle 
for the preservation of the status quo and possibly trying to increase its devolved matters following the 
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“repatriation” of competences from the EU to the United Kingdom. Such a framework  might be the 
most effective solution to handle the “Scottish issue”. Else, the cure seems to be worse than the disease. 
This is not the case in Northern Ireland. Contrary to the Scottish situation, mostly confined within the 
boundaries of domestic law and policy, here the issue acquires an international dimension. The absence 
of barriers between the entity and the Republic of Ireland is a crucial political matter: keeping the border 
open has become, apart from an obvious economic priority, part of the pacification process started with 
the 1998  “Good Friday Agreement”. While the free movement of persons should not be at risk, the 
negotiation between the United Kingdom and the EU has to produce an acceptable outcome in order to 
avoid, at least, systematic checks at the border. Conversely, the perspective of reunifying the island 
according to the “Good Friday Agreement” provisions might sound attractive to a larger share of 
population in the long term.  
It is, however, impossible to disregard the recent political agreement between the Conservatives and the 
Democratic Unionists (DUP) to form a parliamentary coalition in Westminster75, as the DUP’s main 
political point is “to strengthen the Union”. While the agreement mostly concerns economic support for 
the entity and it is rather vague on the post-Brexit status of Northern Ireland, only binding the signatories 
parties to fully adhere to their commitments set out in the “Good Friday Agreement”, it reaffirms that 
the ultimate responsibility for maintaining political stability in the region rests with the British 
Government.76 Moreover, DUP’s policy of strengthening the Union is apparently incompatible with 
every program aimed at achieving a differentiated Brexit for Northern Ireland, as it would be unrealistic 
to argue the absence of negative effects on the relations between the entity and the rest of the United 
Kingdom should an ad hoc solution be effectively implemented. Therefore, it is quite obvious how the 
ultimate meaning of such political understanding is to prioritize the domestic concern of avoiding 
possible restrictions on the relations between the entity and the rest of the United Kingdom over the 
international concern of preventing the imposition of an “hard border” between the two sides of Ireland. 
Lastly, the issue is exacerbated by the absence of a devolved Government due to the persistent failure of 
the talks between the DUP and the Sinn Féin to form a new shared Northern Ireland Executive77 following 
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the snap election of the Northern Ireland Assembly held last March. As a consequence, the entity is 
currently unable to speak with one voice on its post-Brexit priorities in London and with the EU 
negotiating counterparts.  
While Brexit has clearly introduced new frictions between Unionists and Nationalists, there is clear 
evidence that the status quo might imply a severe uncertainty in both political and economic terms from 
2019 onwards. Therefore, all parties involved – from Belfast through London and Dublin to Brussels – 
should exercise a great deal of flexibility and openness while addressing the issue, in order to find a 
generally acceptable compromise capable of giving satisfactory answers to what is otherwise likely to 
evolve into an institutional – and international – stalemate. 
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